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DECISIONS
AmINISTRATIV LAW-DEPORTATION ORDER SUBJECT TO JUDicIAL RE iw UNDER AD-
mNTRAIvE PROCEDURE ACT.-In Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro,1 the Supreme Court of the
United States held that deportation orders under the 1952 Immigration and Na-
tionality Act2 are subject to judicial review under Section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act.3 It was also decided that the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization is not an indispensable party in such an action.
4
This was an action by Pedreiro, a deportee, for a declaratory judgment and in-
junctive relief under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.5 Pedreiro had
exhausted his administrative remedies and sought a review of the proceedings result-
ing in the final order of deportation. The government argued that deportation orders
were reviewable by the courts only in habeas corpus proceedings, 6 and urged also
that the petition be dismissed because the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturali-
zation, being an indispensable party, was not brought into the proceeding. The Fed-
eral District Court dismissed the petition on the latter ground, 7 but the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected both of the government's contentions, and
reversed the lower court.
8
In 1953 it was decided by the Supreme Court 9 that the judicial review provisions
of Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act 10 are not available to an alien for
the purpose of testing the validity of an outstanding deportation order, regardless
of whether the alien is in the custody of the immigration auhorities, and that deporta-
tion orders of the Attorney General under the Immigration Act of 191711 were final
and could not be reviewed, except in habeas corpus actions. The Act said: "In
every case where any person is ordered deported from the United States under the
provisions of this Act, or of any law or treaty, the decision of the Secretary of Labor
shall be final.
s12
The act has been amended to substitute the Attorney General for the Secretary
of Labor.13
Although the Immigration Act of 1952 has a similar provision,14 Justice Black,
speaking for the majority of the Court, said that the decision in the Heikkila case 15
1 349 U. S. 48, 75 S. Ct. 591, 99 L. Ed. 487 (1955).
2 Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 STAT. 163, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101-1503 (1952).
3 Administrative Procedure Act, § 10, 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U. S. C. 1009 (1952).
4 See note 1 supra.
5 See note 3 supra.
6 Annot., 19 A. L. R. 2d 827 (1951).
7 Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, Civil No. 91-400, S. D. N. Y., April 26, 1954.
8 213 F. 2d 768 (2d Cir. 1954).
9 Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. S. 229, 73 S. Ct. 603, 97 L. Ed. 972 (1952).
10 See note 3 supra.
11 39 STAT. 889, as amended, 54 STAT. 1238 (1940), 8 U. S. C. § 155(a) (1940),
repealed June 27, 1952, c. 477, Tit. IV, § 403(a) 47, 66 STAT. 280 (1952).
12 Ibid.
13 54 STAT. 1238 reads: "All functions and powers of the Secretary of Labor re-
lating to the administration of the Immigration arid Naturalization Service and its
functions or to the administration of the immigration and naturalization laws are
transferred to the Attorney General."
14 "In any case in which an alien is ordered deported from the United States
under the provisions of this Act, or of any other law or treaty, the decision of the
Attorney General shall be final."
15 See note 9 supra.
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did not govern, relying on the statement of the Court in that case which pointed out
that the Court was not considering whether the same result should be reached under
the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act "which took effect after Heikkila's com-
plaint was filed. ' 1 6
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides: "Any person suffering
legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such
action within the meaning of any relevant statute shall be entitled to judicial review
thereof."
Section 12 of the same act provides: "No subsequent legislation shall be held to
supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legis-
lation shall do so expressly."
The Court, in the instant case, stated that the 1952 Immigration and Nationality
Act 1 7 has no express language which superseded or modified the expanded right of
review granted by the Administrative Procedure Act. Concerning the contention of
the Government that the express language of modification was the word "final", the
Court said: "It is more in harmony with the generous review provisions of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act to construe the ambiguous word "final" in the 1952
Immigration Act as referring to finality in administrative procedure rather than as
cutting off the right of judicial review in whole or in part."'
1 8
To sustain its position, the Court took excerpts'
0 from statements made by the
co-sponsors2O of the 1952 Act, which excerpts were interpreted to mean that the
word "final" referred to finality in administrative procedure.
The Court also held that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization is
not an indispensable party to this type of action because the District Director is
charged with the enforcement of the warrants of deportation and his rulings are final
in the issuance of the warrants.2 1 The deportee should not be required to go all the
way to Washington, D. C. to commence this type of action. The Court said that the
policy in determining the indispensability of parties was determined on practical con-
siderations, and therefore it was concluded that the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization is not an indispensable party.
The Court's conclusion that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion is not an indispensable party in this type of action presents no problem in logic,
or in justice. It would seem, though, that the arguments upon which the conclusion
that deportation orders under the 1953 Immigration and Nationality Act are subject
to judicial review under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act was reached,
are greatly weakened by the dissenting opinion in the case.
22 Justice Minton, speak-
ing for the dissenting Justices,
2 3 submits argument, which seems to show the intent
of Congress to have been otherwise than that put forth by the majority. Justice Min-
ton reviewed the Senate committee report
2 4 made prior to the enactment of the 1952
act, which seems to point out that orders of deportation were not intended to be
subject to judicial review under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The
16 Id. at 232, n. 4, 73 S. Ct. at 604, 97 L. Ed. at 975.
17 See note 2 supra.
18 349 U. S. at 51, 75 S. Ct. at 594, 99 L. Ed. at 491 (1955).
19 98 Cong. Rec. 4416; 98 Cong. Rec. 5778.
20 Representative Walter and Senator McCarran.
21 8 CFR, §§ 243.1, 243.2.
22 See note 1 supra.
28 Justices Reed and Burton also dissented.
24 S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 629 (1950).
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dissent's interpretation of the word "final" would preclude all judicial review under
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, and the petitioner would be restricted
to his remedy under habeas corpus.
In the Heikkila case the Supreme Court interpreted the clause which included
the ambiguous word "final" to preclude the judicial review except by habeas corpus
proceedings. When the clauses of the two acts are compared2 5 a substantial similarity
is apparent between the clauses in dispute, and it would follow that any interpreta-
tion of the later clause, would be the second time the Supreme Court would have
ruled upon the issue. It should also be noted that Justice Black had dissented in
the Heikkila case, while justice Minton, speaking for the dissenting justices in the
Pedreiro case, had been a member of the majority of the Court in the Heikkila case.
Since Section 242(b) of the 1952 Act 2 6 is a re-enactment, almost verbatim, of
the "final" clause of the 1917 Act, it would seem that the Heikkila v. Barber2 7
should not be considered to be distinguishable from the Pedreiro case, but rather
that the decision in the Pedreiro case has reversed the holding of the Supreme Court
in the Heikkil case.
An ImsmATV LAW-AGENCY'S FAILURE TO MAKE ITs OwN ASSESSMXNT OF EVIDENCE,
INDEPENDENT or TRIAL ExAm=R's CONCLusIONs, HELD GROUND FOR VACATING DE-
TEmntATioN-The Board of Estimate of the City of New York is under a statutory
duty to pass on the sufficiency and quality of evidence presented in a proceeding,
brought by the widow of a deceased city employee, for accidental death benefits
under Section B3-33.0 of the Administrative Code.' Such examination of the evidence
must be independent from that made by the trial examiner, and if the Board affirms
the examiner's recommendations on the ground that it is bound by the findings of
facts below, its determination must as a matter of law be set aside, it was held by
the Court of Appeals, and the case returned for proper consideration.
2
A widow filed a claim with the Board under said section B3-33.0, which pro-
vides that benefits be paid to the dependent of a member of the city employees'
Retirement System who dies as a result of an accident not due to his willful negli-
gence. 3 Her husband, a New York City subway employee, had been found lying
against a live third rail, and died as a result of injuries caused by the electrical cur-
rent. The Board of Estimate ordered a hearing on the claim before a trial commit-
tee consisting of one appointee of the Board.
At the hearing, it was shown that chemical analysis of decedent's liver revealed
the presence of ethyl alcohol. The extensive medical testimony given by the widow's
expert witness and by the toxocologist for the Medical Board of the Retirement
System was conflicting. The claimant's doctor stated that it would be impossible to
ascertain how much alcohol had been consumed by an examination of the liver. The
25 See notes 12 and 14, supra.
26 See note 2 supra.
27 See note 9 supra.
1 L. 1939, c. 927, NEW YORK CITY CHARTER AND ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ANNO-
TATED, p. 271.
2 Matter of Kilgus v. Board of Estimate, 308 N. Y. 620 (1955).
3 See note 1 supra.
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toxicologist testified that the amount of alcohol present in the liver was sufficient
for intoxication. The decedent's foreman testified that one and one half hours before
the body was found there was no indication that he had been drinking.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial examiner recommended denial of the
application for death benefits because decedent's death had resulted from his own willful
negligence in drinking alcohol while engaged in a hazardous occupation, in violation
of safety rules in effect for transit employees. The full Board was provided with a
transcript of the hearing. At a subsequent meeting it discussed and denied the appli-
cation.
Seeking judicial review in a proceeding pursuant to article 78 of the New York
Civil Practice Act, the claimant contended that the Board had not discharged the duty
imposed on it by statute, in that a majority of the Board (three members) had felt
bound by the recommendation of the trial committee and had so voted. In vacating
the determination, the Court of Appeals held that the Board was mistaken in think-
ing itself bound by the findings of the trial committee, and in thinking that it could
not reverse such findings except where overwhelming proof absolutely established
that the trial committee had been in error.
In reviewing the determinations of administrative tribunals, the courts are nar-
rowly limited to questions of law. "The judicial function is exhausted when there
is found to be a rational basis for the conclusion approved by the administrative tri-
bunal."4 The courts may review questions of fact as well as law on appeal from
a trial court, but the review by the court of administrative bodies as to findings
of fact is limited by the Civil Practice Act 5 to inquiries as to "whether there was any
competent proof . . . to authorize [the] determination,"O and "if there was such
proof . . . [whether] .. .there was such a preponderance of proof against the exist-
ence of those facts that the verdict ...would be set aside ... as against the weight
of the evidence." 7 The record in the instant case indicated that the Board either did not
know or did not appreciate the role of the court in reviewing determinations of ad-
ministrative bodies. The Board's failure to make an independent assessment of the
evidence required the court not to find competent proof or a preponderance of proof,
but rather required reversal of the order appealed from.
Judge Fuld in the dissenting opinion agreed that the Board is under a statutory
duty to make an independent determination after examination of the record, but re-
jected the conclusion that the three members of the Board had abandoned this duty.
He found that careful examination was made by the Board and that their remarks
were "at best ambiguous." The dissent refused to apply the rule of Matter of Daley
v. Board of Estimate8 and Matter of Weekes v. O'Connell to the procedure followed
by the Board of Estimate in this matter, on the ground that the facts in those two
cases, in which the Court had vacated the orders, were quite different. In the Daley
case, none of the sworn statements which had been submitted in support of the
claim were placed before the Board of Estimate by the Medical Board of the Retire-
ment System, nor had the Medical Board transmitted additional information dis-
4 Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 59 S. Ct. 754, 83 L. Ed.
1147 (1939).
5 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1296.
6 Id., subd. 6.
7 Id., subd. 7.
8 267 App. Div. 592, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 139 (1st Dept. 1944).
9 304 N. Y. 259, 107 N. E. 2d 290 (1952).
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closed by investigation. It presented its conclusions, which the Board of Estimate ac-
cepted. The Weekes case dealt with a proceeding to revoke a restaurant liquor li-
cense, in which the State Liquor Authority failed to obtain a full transcription of
the hearing before rendering its decision. In both cases the orders of the agencies
were annulled, inasmuch as their determinations could not possibly have been based
on a consideration of all the evidence.
In the instant case, the Board did have all the evidence before it, and the de-
cision of the Court of Appeals appears to extend by definition the statutory duty
imposed on the administrative agency. Not only must the agency have before it all
the evidence, but it must make a fresh assessment of that evidence, independent from
that made by the trial examiner. If it does not, but instead automatically affirms
the conclusions of the examiner, leaving the claimant to his remedy in the courts, the
determination must as a matter of law be annulled.
WoRx cmNl's COMPENSATION-RIGHT oF ELECTION TO AccEPT CoMPENSATiON AND RE-
COVER DAnEAGES AT ComraroN LAw.-The United States Supreme Court has now ruled
that an employee may sue a third party for damages in a common-law negligence
action in the state where he was injured, even though he had previously begun receiv-
ing workmen's compensation in his home state1
Virgil Carroll, a Missourian, and an employee of a Missouri painting company,
was injured in Arkansas while working there on a job on which his employer was
the subcontractor. He began receiving payments under the Missouri Workmen's
Compensation Act. 2 After eight months of such payments, Carroll sued the prime
contractor, one Lanza, in Arkansas in a third party action to recover damages for
his injuries. 3 Arkansas, unlike Missouri,4 does not require employees to make an
election between accepting compensation under its Act, or suing in negligence, where
a third party is involved and has held that a general contractor such as Carroll is
a third party within the meaning of the statute.5
The Arkansas trial court awarded substantial damages. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals sustained Lanza's contention that Arkansas, under the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution, should have respected Missouri's statute, which made its
own remedies exclusive. 6 When the case reached the United States Supreme Court,
the trial court's verdict was reinstated.
Workmen's Compensation Statutes in the United States are of comparatively recent
origin. New York State enacted the first one only 45 years ago.7 These statutes
1 Carroll v. Lanza, 75 S. Ct. 804 (1955).
2 The Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act, Mo. REv. STAT. 1949, § 287.120,
provides the rights and remedies granted by it shall exclude all other rights and reme-
dies at common law or otherwise.
3 APix. STAT. 1947, § 81-1301.
4 Mo. REV. STAT. 1949, § 287.060. Interestingly enough, the election must be made
prior to the accident.
5i Ark. Stat. 1947, § 81-1340.
6 U. S. CONST. art. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records and Judicial Proceedings of every other State . . ."
Although the word "statute" does not appear, the Supreme Court in Bradford
Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 52 S. Ct. 571, 76 L. ed. 1026 (1933), con-
cluded that a statute is a "public" act within the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.
7 L. 1910, c. 674.
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were a departure from the common law on the subject of recovery for injuries sus-
tained in the course of employment. Under common law, recovery by an injured
employee was the exception, rather than the rule.
8 England attempted to modify
the harshness of the common law by enacting Employers' Liability Acts in the
Nineteenth Century, but the Acts failed to change or modify the basic common law
principle of responsibility in tort-that is, to recover, the employee had to show fault
on the employer's part.
Workmen's Compensation Acts proceeded on an entirely new concept-an injured
employee was entitled, not to damages, but to compensation, regardless of who was
at fault. The question soon arose as to an employee's right to sue, where a third
party's negligence was involved.
9 In such cases, could the employee sue the third
party for adequate damages, or was he limited to the fixed, and comparatively smaller
award of the Compensation Statutes? Since these statutes changed the common law
by permitting an employee to recover compensation without regard to whose negli-
gence, if any, contributed to the injury; and since the employers were the sole
contributors to the fund established under the statutes, many states made the remedy
an exclusive one.1 0 Some, however, permitted the employee to make an election,
whether to accept compensation under the statute, or to sue (if a third party were
involved), with the proviso that once the election was made, it was conclusive and
irrevocable.1 1 The remaining states permit an employee both to receive compensa-
tion, and to sue the third party, provided the employee agrees to refunct a certain
percentage of the compensation paid him for any recovery.
2  I
In the Carroll case, the Court of Appeals had relied on Magnolia Petroleum Co.
v. Hunt.'3 However, when the case reached the Supreme Court six of the justices there
held that the Magnolia case was not applicable. They pointed out that in that case,
the employee after receiving the final payment for compensation in the forum of the
injury, had then returned to his home state, and sued under its compensation act.
Since he had received a final compensation, he was held to be barred under the full
faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution.
The Supreme Court elected to follow Pacific Employer's Insurance Co. v. Com-
mrssion14 (decided in 1938), in which an employee of a Massachusetts corporation,
residing in Massachusetts and regularly employed in that state under a contract of
employment entered into there, was injured in the course of his employment while
temporarily in California. The Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Statute pur-
ported to give an exclusive remedy, even though the injury was suffered outside the
State. It was held that the courts of California were not bound by the full faith
and credit clause of the federal Constitution to follow the Massachusetts Statute, if
it was contrary to the policy of their state.
The Supreme Court, by following the Employer's Insurance case, overruled, with-
out specifically so stating, the previous case of Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper.
1
8 For a case involving the operative effect of the common law see Alabama Great
Southern R. R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1894).
9 STUMBERO, CoNucr or LAWS 213 (Brooklyn, 2d ed., 1951).
10 Northern P. R. R. v. Meese, 239 U. S. 614, 36 S. Ct. 223, 60 L. Ed. 467
(1951).
"1 58 Am. JUR. 885-887.
12 New York revised its Workmen's Compensation Act in 1924 to bring it within
this pattern.
13 320 U. S. 430, 64 S. Ct. 208, 88 L. ed. 149 (1952).
14 306 U. S. 493, 59 S. Ct. 629, 83 L. ed. 940 (1938).
15 Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, supra note 6.
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In that case, an employer having its principal place of business in Vermont, and
its employee, a Vermont resident, entered into a contract in Vermont, thus accept-
ing the Vermont Workmen's Compensation Act. That act provided that injury or
death of an employee whether suffered in Vermont or elsewhere, should be compen-
sated for exclusively under provisions of the Act, and expressly excluded recourse to
actions based on tort. The employee died of an injury received while in New Hamp-
shire. The Court held: (1) That the Vermont statute was a defense available to the
employer in a wrongful death action, brought in the federal courts in New Hamp-
shire, by the personal representative of the deceased. (2) That refusal to recognize
such a defense was a denial of full faith and credit to the Vermont Statute. (3) That
although the New Hampshire Compensation Act gives employees the right to elect
either to sue for negligence or to accept compensation, it would not be obnoxious
to New Hampshire public policy to give effect to the Vermont Statute in a case
which involved only the rights of Vermont residents.
The majority's reasoning for refusing to follow the Clapper case is best sum-
marized in the final paragraph of their opinion: 1 6
"Missouri can make her Compensation Act exclusive if she chooses, and enforce
it as she pleases within her borders. Once that policy is extended into other States,
different considerations come into play. Arkansas can adopt Missouri's policy if she
likes. Or . . . she may supplement it or displace it with another . . . were it other-
wise, the State where the injury occurred would be powerless to provide any remedies
or safeguards to non-resident employees working within its borders. We do not think
the Full Faith and Credit Clause demands that subserviency from the State of the
injury."
The three dissenting justices in the Carroll case,1 7 after an analysis of the conflict
of laws existing in various states on the subject of full faith and credit for statutes
of a sister state, reached the conclusion that the problem had been thoroughly con-
sidered and resolved in the previous case of Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper,'S and
felt bound by the holding therein. They were of the opinion that the majority was
discarding the Clapper case "on the presupposition that full faith and credit need not
be given to a sister-state workmen's compensation statute if the law of the forum
happens to be more favorable to the claimant."'1 9
The dissenting opinion appears to overlook the fact that Carroll was injured in
Arkansas. It was on this premise that Arkansas permitted Carroll to sue in its
courts. The dissenting opinion attempts to brush this aside by saying: "No rights
of Arkansas residents are involved, since none of the parties is an Arkansan; the
workman was removed immediately to a Missouri hospital and has, so far as appears,
remained in Missouri." 20 But once Carroll was injured in Arkansas, it was Arkansas
law which should prevail, if there was a conflict of laws with a sister state; for it
is well settled that in a tort action, the law of the state where the injury was sus-
tained, governs. 2 1
It is hoped that ultimately Workmen's Compensation Acts will be standardized
16 Carroll v. Lanza, supra note 1 at 807-808.
17 Justices Frankfurter, Burton and Harlan.
18 Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, supra note 6. Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote
the opinion which the dissenting Justices in the Carroll case termed "long-matured,
weighty."
19 Carroll v. Lanza, supra note 1 at 812.
20 Ibid.
21 STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 10 at 213.
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and made uniform throughout the States. The Carroll case illustrates one of the reasons
why a Uniform Workmen's Compensation Act should be enacted with all possible
dispatch.
PROCEDUE-PROOF 3N TORT HELD TO SUSTAIN RECOVERY N CoNmAcT.-In an action to
recover damages for injury to an automobile motor resulting from the failure of de-
fendant, a filling station operator, to place sufficient oil in the crankcase for the proper
operation of the motor, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain a finding of breach of contract in spite of the fact that the case
was tried upon the tort theory of defendant's negligence. i
In order to have her car greased and the oil changed, the plaintiff had taken her car
to the defendant's filling station. En route home, a distance of four and a half miles,
she noticed nothing unusual in the operation of the car motor. But two days later, after
having driven two miles, she heard a noise under the hood which, due to previous ex-
perience, she thought originated in some difficulty in the heater. She then drove four
miles to another filling station where she was informed by the service attendant that
the crankcase was almost empty. The plaintiff shortly thereafter commenced an action
to recover damages sustained as the result of the defendant's failure to place sufficient
oil in the crankcase; at the trial there was testimony that the motor was so badly
damaged that a new one was required.
The issues were submitted to the jury and while they were deliberating, the Court
recalled them and submitted to them three additional queries: (1) Whether the plaintiff
was negligent in the operation of her car; (2) Whether such negligence if found, was a
proximate cause of the damage to her car; (3) What was the comparative proportion
of the negligence attributable to the plaintiff and the defendant?
The jury found the defendant guilty of negligence in failing to put the proper
amount of oil in the crankcase, and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the
damage to the car, which damages they assessed at $333.32. In addition, in answer to the
supplemental inquiries, the jury found that the plaintiff was negligent in the operation
of her car, that the negligence was the proximate cause of damage to her car, and at-
tributed 25 per cent of the total negligence to the defendant and 75 per cent to the
plaintiff.
Since Wisconsin is one of the states which has adopted the doctrine of comparative
negligence, an apportionment of negligence in tort actions is entirely proper. However,
upon motions after verdict, the Court held this determination of plaintiff's comparative
negligence, as well as the rest of the supplemental verdict, to be superfluous, and struck
it out, giving judgment to the plaintiff for the full amount of the damage assessed by
the jury. Defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court held that the case should have been tried upon a contract
theory rather than upon a tort theory, in that the parties had entered into a contract
by which the defendant agreed to fill the crankcase with oil, and his failure to do so
resulted in a breach of the contract. The Court, however, was unwilling to remand the
case for a new trial, for despite the fact that it had been tried on an erroneous theory,
there had been a true determination of the real issues involved.
The Court went on to say that since the parties had entered into a contract, and
since the defendant had breached his implied agreement to place sufficient oil in the
crankcase for the proper operation of the car, it was unnecessary to establish negligence
on the part of the defendant or to apportion the negligence of the parties. The finding
1 Schmidt v. Schabow, 265 Wis. 154, 60 N. W. 2d 735 (1953).
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by the jury that the defendant failed to put the proper amount of oil in the crankcase
and that this was the proximate cause of the damage to the plaintiff's car, was all that
was needed to support an action based on a contract theory. The jury's finding that the
defendant "negligently" failed in this duty, and that this "negligence" resulted in the
damage was merely surplusage and immaterial, and in view of. this it was not necessary
to remand the case for a new trial on the ground that there had not been a determina-
tion of the real issue involved. Upon the findings of the jury, the action could be
treated as though tried on a contractual theory rather than in tort. The Supreme Court
therefore, refused to remand the case for a new trial, and treated the action as though it
had been tried and determined upon the theory of breach of contract. Since the plaintiff
had offered sufficient proof to sustain the breach of contract, it cannot be argued that
he had waived his right simply because of a misnomer.
The Supreme Court went on to say that if the plaintiff is to be charged with any
breach of duty it must be based upon her failure to mitigate the damages after hearing
the noise in the motor, and not upon contributory negligence. Since no part of the
plaintiff's conduct up to the time of the defendant's wrongful act could be construed as
contributing to the damage, and since the most that could be said of the plaintiff was
that by her subsequent omission she enhanced the damages, if recovery is to be denied
the plaintiff to any extent it must be predicated upon the theory that she failed to
mitigate the damages resulting from the defendant's wrongful act and not upon com-
parative negligence. Failure on the part of the plaintiff, after a breach, to use due care
to prevent or diminish consequences which are avoidable in whole or in part, is a matter
of defense distinct from contributory negligence.2 Contributory negligence is antecedent
in time, or at least simultaneous with the defendant's wrongful act, and in many juris-
dictions is a complete bar to an action, while the question of avoidable consequences
arises, only after a cause of action has already accrued and after the discovery of the
wrongful act. Once the injury has been discovered, whether as the result of a tort or of
a breach of contract, reasonable care must be exercised to minimize the resulting damage.3
Facts in mitigation. of damages were not pleaded in the answer. There is a split
of authority over whether that issue must be pleaded. Some jurisdictions hold that
matters in mitigation of damages may be shown under a general denial only, while in
other jurisdictions it is required to be specially pleaded by the defendant 4 But no matter
which rule be applied, the defendant is required to offer sufficient data to permit a reason-
able estimate of how much the damage could have been mitigated or to what extent they
were enhanced by the plaintiff.5 This would be true whether the action were in tort
or in contract. Since no proof was offered by the defendant showing a failure on the
part of the plaintiff to mitigate the damages, and since there was no request that the
issue be submitted to the jury, an award for the full amount was given to the plaintiff.
The defendant unsuccessfully argued that the trial court's finding of a percentage of
negligence attributable to plaintiff was tantamount to a finding of failure to mitigate
damages to that extent. Defendant contended that he should not be denied this defense
merely because of "minomer."
It is a fallacy to assume that a finding of 25 per cent comparatory negligence amounts
to a finding that the damages could have been mitigated to the same extent. One's
negligence following an injury may be gross, yet if the entire injury has occurred be-
fore it is possible to take steps to mitigate it, then the negligence is so disconnected
2 Crosby v. Plummer, 111 Me. 355, 89 Atl. 145 (1913).
3 Annot., 81 A. L. R. 282 (1932).
4 25 C. J. S. § 142, p. 780 (1941).
5 25 C. 3. S. § 162, p. 816 (1941). Branon v. Ellbe Pictures Corp., 42 Ga. App.
293, 155 S. E. 923 (1930).
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with the injury as to be meaningless. Here, since it is entirely possible that the motor
might have been entirely ruined before the slightest noise was heard, any negligence on
the part of the plaintiff in continuing to drive after hearing such noise does not neces-
sarily go to prove that the damages could have been mitigated at all, or to sustain a
possible "misnomer" theory. Since the defendant offered no proof of how much the
plaintiff's actions after leaving the service station operated to enlarge the damages, as
above mentioned, an award for the full amount to the plaintiff was proper.
Nor can the defendant be heard to say that since the case was originally tried upon
a tort theory, and recovery was allowed upon a contract theory, the defendant was
deprived of the defense of the plaintiff's failhre to mitigate the damages. Since failure
to mitigate damages is a defense which is available both in tort and contract actions,
it is inconsequential that recovery was ultimately allowed on a contract theory rather
than a tort theory.
In view of defendant's inability to establish any failure on the part of the plaintiff
to mitigate damages, recovery .was allowed for the full amount of the damage to the
car which the jury assessed at $333.32. Although no comment was made by the Court,
this was clearly in line with the famous rule of general damages as laid down in Hadley
v. Baxendale,6 which allows recovery for all damages in breach of contract which are
the natural, reasonable, and probable consequences of the breach.
Ev:ExcE-SUFI cn cY or Ca cmsTAgirrm EVIDENcE TO SUPPORT JURY's INFERENcEs
OF CAUSATION AND NEGLIGNCE.-In an action to recover for personal injuries sustained
by an infant, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, Second Department,
holding that despite the absence of direct evidence, the jury could infer negligence and
causation from the circumstantial evidence adduced at the trial.1
The infant plaintiff and his family were vacationing in a bungalow colony in a
New York resort area. The bungalows were situated on a narrow, private, dead-end
access road, completely isolated from the main road. The bedding of the access road
consisted of rough cinders and stones. Between the bungalows and the road were
lawns of grass and weeds.
On the day of the accident, the 19-month-old plaintiff was playing with several
other children on the lawn in front of one of the bungalows. A taxicab owned by de-
fendant was seen coming down this road "pretty fast".2 It passed the lawn where
the children were playing, and went on to one of the other bungalows at the far end of
the dirt road, where it turned off the road and stopped on the grass. The driver ad-
mitted seeing the children playing on the lawn when he drove into the road.
At that time, the infant was left alone for just a few moments. When the other
children returned, they found him lying face down and unconscious, half on the road,
and half on the grass. At that moment, an adult witness saw the taxi leaving the
bungalow colony. It had not yet made its turn onto the main road, and was described
as travelling "very fast".
The child's body was described as follows: "EH]is head was 'completely bloody',
and his clothes were bloody, torn, dirty and black, with 'gravel, oil, stains' and
'grease' ".3 The infant's injuries consisted of a fractured skull, shock, abrasion and
lacerations. There was a triangular laceration of the forehead and frontal areas which
o 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
I Stein v. Palisi, 308 N. Y. 293, 125 N. E. 2d 575 (1955).
2 Id. at 295, 125 N. E. 2d 575, 577.
a Id. at 295, 125 N. E. 2d 575, 576.
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penetrated all layers of the scalp and bared the bone of the skull.4 These lacerations
were abrasive and had a brush characteristic which indicated to the attending physician
that "either the skin was moving across some surface or some surface moved across the
skin in such wise that this material was ground into these lacerations and abrasions". 5
He added that these scars could not have been caused by a fall or a blow, but were
definitely due to an abrasive trauma. There was no other evidence of any person, motor
vehicle, or object in the vicinity which was capable of inflicting upon the body injuries
of the severity and character of those described. 6 On the foregoing evidence, the jury
returned a verdict for plaintiff, upon which the trial court entered judgment.
On appeal, the Appellate Division held that there was no evidence adduced at the
trial upon which an inference of negligent causation could be based, and therefore
reversed the trial court, dismissing the complaint.
7
The only time a dismissal will be affirmed is when it can be concluded by no
rational process that the jury could have based a finding in favor of plaintiff on the
evidence presented.8 The issue thus presented to the Court of Appeals was whether
the plaintiff had stated facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case.
The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the jury did have the right to infer negligent
causation, stated the general rule that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a
verdict if it gives rise to an inference of causation and negligence, even though it does
not negative the existence of remote possibilities that the injury was not caused by the
defendant, or that defendant was not negligent.9 A complaint will not be dismissed
on the law where the plaintiff upon trial comes forward with evidence of facts and
conditions from which defendant's negligence and causation of the injury by such negli-
gence may be reasonably inferred.1 0 The Court here held that plaintiff's evidence had
been sufficient to support the verdict.
There is no fixed rule as to when an inference of negligent causation will be per-
mitted; it depends on the facts in the particular case.1 1 In an action for death caused
by negligence, relevant conditions surrounding and relating to the occurrence may be
considered, in the absence of direct proof, and from such conditions it may be deter-
mined what inferences are thereby created.1 2 Even in the absence of direct proof,
negligence may be inferred from circumstances surrounding the injury, if not from
the fact of injury itself.' 3
Three past decisions of the Court of Appeals, all reported as memoranda, were
cited by the Court as illustrative of the extent to which inferences drawn by the jury
wiil be allowed to stand.
In Wank v. Ambrosino,1 4 the defendant while slowly driving his car at night on a
well-lighted city street, felt a bump. He stopped and examined his tires, but finding
nothing wrong, started up again. He soon heard more noises, and this time after exam-
ination found plaintiff's adult intestate under his car. The majority of the Court of
4 Id. at 296, 125 N. E. 2d 575, 576.
5 Id. at 296, 125 N. E. 2d 575, 576.
6 Id. at 296, 125 N. E. 2d 575, 578.
7 Stein v. Palisi, 283 App. Div. 1119, 131 N. Y. S. 2d 648 (2d Dept. 1954).
8 Blum v. Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., 292 N. Y. 241, 54 N. E. 2d 809 (1944).
o See note 1 supra, at 293, 125 N. E. 2d 575.
10 Betzag v. Gulf Oil Co., 298 N. Y. 916, 83 N. E. 2d 833 (1949).
11 See note 1 supra, at 293, 125 N. E. 2d 575.
12 Gross v. State, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 379 (Ct. Cl. 1944).
13 Garrow v. State, 294 N. Y. 741, 61 N. E. 2d 523 (1945).
14 307 N. Y. 321, 121 N. E. 2d 246 (1954).
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Appeals held that an inference of negligence causation could not be permitted, because
there was no showing of facts from which negligence could be inferred 1,
In Scantlebury v. Lehman,'6 the injured person was found lying near the path
which the defendant's vehicle was known to have taken. There was no direct evidence
as to how the accident had happened, and the driver testified that he had not seen the
victim before the accident. However, the Court there allowed the inference of negligent
causation.
In Klein v. Long Island R.R. Co,17 plaintiff's intestate was killed at an intersection
owned and operated by defendant. The deceased had been seen walking near the scene
of the accident just a short time before the train passed the intersection. There was no
direct evidence as to how the accident actually occurred, and yet the Court allowed the
inference of negligent causation.
While in the Wank case, it was necessary to infer only negligence, in the Scantlebury
and Klein cases an inference of causation as well as an inference of negligence had to be
made. The Court of Appeals, applying the standards expressed in these cases, held that
the jury had the right to infer from the physical circumstances of the present case that
the only way the infant could have received his injuries was through contact with de-
fendant's taxi, and that they had the right to believe that the defendant's driver had
not exercised due care,18 thus giving rise to the inference of negligence. From all these
facts, the Court held that plaintiff had made out a prima facie case. It reversed the
judgment of the Appellate Division and sent the case back for a new trial.
With the addition of this latest decision to the case law, the New York rule seems
to be that, even in the absence of direct evidence, an inference both of causation and
of negligence may be made where such inferences are based upon competent and suffi-
cient circumstantial evidence.
LEGAL ETHIcS--JNAuTHORIZED PRAc1icE By MXICA ATroTNEY iN NEW YORK.-In
accordance with the objective of the New York Bar to protect the public against the un-
authorized practice of law, the New York County Lawyers' Association instituted special
proceedings against a Mexican Attorney for holding himself out as a consultant on
Mexican law in the State of New York.1
As a result of these special proceedings, the Supreme Court, New York County, held
in contempt of court a Mexican attorney, not admitted to the bar of this State, who
had advertised in the daily metropolitan newspapers, offering consultation and legal ad-
vice to the public principally with regard to Mexican divorces. Such solicitation was
held to constitute the unlawful practice of law, in violation of the Penal2 and Judiciary
Laws. 3
An injunction was granted restraining the Mexican attorney from performing these
legal services, and limiting any further advice on his part concerning Mexican Law, to
that requested by duly licensed New York attorneys.
15 Id. at 324, 121 N. E. 2d 246, 247.
16 305 N. Y. 713, 117 N. E. 2d 493 (1952).
17 303 N. Y. 807, 104 N. E. 2d 364 (1952).
18 Hammer v. Bloomingdale Bros., Inc., 215 App. Div. 308, 213 N. Y. Supp. 743
(Ist Dept. 1926); Day v. Johnson, 265 App. Div. 383, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 203 (4th Dept.
1943) ; Schwartz v. Petfield, 283 App. Div. 845, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 516 (4th Dept. 1954).
1 Matter of New York County Lawyers' Association, 133 N. Y. L. J. 47, col. 4
(N. Y. Sup. Ct., March 9, 1955).
2 N. Y. PENAL L. § 270.
3 N. Y. JuD. L. § 750-b; Id. § 90.
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The problem presented had never been considered by the courts of this State:
whether a lawyer of a foreign country, though not admitted to the bar of this State,
may offer his services to the public as a foreign attorney, and give legal advice with
respect to the law of that country. In adjudging that these acts constitute the unlawful
practice of law, in contravention of the publid policy of this State, the court has ex-
tended the meaning of the phrase "unlawful practices."
Three procedures are presently available to deter the unlawful practice of law.
One is the criminal prosecution of the offender for violation of Section 270 of the Penal
Law;4 the second, an action against him for injunctive relief pursuant to Article 75-a
of the Civil Practice Act.5 The third procedure, utilized here, is the bringing of sum-
mary proceedings under Section 90, subdivision 2, and Section 750-b of the Judiciary
Law.0
Section 90 of the Judiciary Law gives the Supreme Court the power to control all
persons practicing or assuming to practice law, and Section 750-b of the Judiciary Law
gives to the Supreme Court the power to punish for criminal contempt any person who
unlawfully practices or assumes to practice law.
Section 270 of the Penal Law does not explicitly set out those acts which consti-
tute "unlawful practices." The task of definition has been left to the courts. It has
been held that an attorney of another state, who sets up practice in New York and
holds himself out as one competent to give legal advice with regard to New York law,
violates Section 270.7 It has further been held that any question relative to tax law
requires the consultation of an attorney and not that of a public accountant.8
The courts, in the process of interpreting and ruling upon Section 270, have decided
that preparation of legal documents by one not duly admitted to practice is in violation
of the statute.9 Legal proceedings participated in by persons not authorized to practice
law in this State have been considered nugatory and ineffectual.1 o Judgments obtained
in courts of this State have been denied legal effect, considered to be null and void,
where such judgments were obtained by persons not regularly admitted to practice. 11
Therefore, despite his membership in the bar of another country, this Mexican
lawyer is, in the eyes of the court, a "layman" and as such may no more hold himself
out to the public in New York as a legal consultant than may lay citizens and domi-
ciliaries of the state.
It is interesting to note that a bill which would have amended Section 469 of the
Judiciary Law, and which would permit conduct by foreign attorneys such as that
enjoined by the court in the instant case, was defeated in committee in the Senate and
the Assembly in the 1955 session of the Legislature.
12
Thus, in this decision by Justice Eder of the Supreme Court, County of New York,
the judicial department has acknowledged the apparent will of the Legislature by leav-
ing to the organized bar the task of deciding what constitutes the unlawful practice
of law.
4 See note 2 supra.
5 N. Y. Cry. PRAc. Acr § 75-a.
0 See note 3 supra.
7 People v. Collins, 271 App. Div. 511, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 53 (1st Dept. 1946).
8 Matter of Bercu, 299 N. Y. 728, 87 N. E. 2d 451 (1948).
9 People v. Alfani, 227 N. Y. 335, 125 N. E. 671 (1919).
10 Cotton v. Oshrin, 155 Misc. 383, 278 N. Y. Supp. 146 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co., 1934).
11 Kaplan v. Berman, 37 Misc. 502, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1012 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co., 1902).
12 S. Int. 880, Pr. 907, McCullough; A. Int. 840, Pr. 843, Meighan.
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Zozysc,--REzoNWo BY Towx S rum 0NG Onr AN EXIsTiNG UsE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
-The New York Court of Appeals has recently ruled that a zoning ordinance which
deprived a corporation, engaged in the quarrying of sand and gravel, of the right to
continue and extend its excavations, amounted to the deprivation of a vested right
within the purview of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and as
such was unconstitutional insofar as it applied to the owners and operators of the sand
and gravel enterprise.1
In 1943 defendants, Camarco & Camarco Contractors, Inc., acquired two parcels
of land, separated by a road, which they employed in their sand and gravel business.
In 1945 plaintiff, Town of Somers adopted a zoning ordinance which placed defend-
ants' property in a residential zone. The defendants had an investment of substantial
value in land, plants, and structures on both their parcels of land at the time the
zoning ordinance was passed. Article II, section 5(b) of that ordinance provided for
the continuance of non-conforming uses and structures as follows:
"B. Continuing Non-Conforming Uses or Structures
"Any building, structure or actual bona fide use, involving a substantial monetary
investment, which shall exist at the time of the enactment of this ordinance may be
continued, even though such building, structure or use shall not conform with the pro-
visions of this ordinance for the district in which it is located, provided such existing
building, structure or use shall have been constructed, altered or used in conformity with
law and which shall be in conformity with other existing law. No change of use, how-
ever, shall be made in any building or land or part thereof unless such changed use shall
be in conformity with the provisions of this ordinance. ' 2
In 1952 and 1953 the zoning ordinance was amended and Article II, section 10(u)
was added. In addition Article II, section 5(b) was amended so that the protection
afforded to existing non-conforming uses no longer applied to any "natural product uses"
as set forth in Article II, section 10(u).
At the trial in Special Term, where the Town of Somers sought to enjoin Camarco
from further excavation, six neighboring residents testified to the residential character of
the neighborhood and to the nature of the defendants' enterprise. The Special Term
denied the injunction on the ground that such an injunction would be an improper
exercise of the police power.
The courts have imposed the test of reasonableness in the exercise of police powers
upon those who have existing non-conforming uses.3 In People v. Miller,4 the keeping
of pigeons was not a vested right within the meaning of the statute involved, and the
prohibition, by enforcement of the statute, of a continuing non-conforming use would
not cause serious financial harm to the property owner by rendering valueless sub-
stantial improvements or businesses built up over the years. In Tenement House De-
partment v. Moeschen,5 it was held that a New York City Tenement House Acto re-
quiring all school sinks, privy vaults, etc. in existing tenement houses in cities of the
first class, to be removed and replaced by individual water closets, was a proper and
constitutional exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of the public
health. It was also held that the fact the act is applicable only to cities of the first
1 Town of Somers v. Camarco, 308 N. Y. 537, 127 N. E. 2d 327 (1955).
2 Zoning Ordinance of Town of Somers, Art. II, § 5(b).
3 People v. Miller, 304 N. Y. 105, 106 N. E. 2d 34 (1952); Tenement House Dept.
v. Moeschen, 179 N. Y. 325, 72 N. E. 231 (1904).
4 People v. Miller, supra note 3.
5 Tenement House Dept. v. Moeschen, supra note 3.
6 Tenement House Act, L. 1901, c. 334, § 100, as amd. by L. 1902, c. 352, § 47.
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class and pertained only to tenement houses does not offend the provision of the four-
teenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that no
state shall "' . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws,' 7 nor does the Act, by reason of its application to existing buildings, violate
the constitutional provisions against taking private property for public use without
just compensation."s In both the Miller case9 and the Tenement House Department
case10 the court has applied the test of reasonableness in the light of the problems
presented by the particular factual situation.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals held as unconstitutional, insofar as they
apply to the respondents, sections 5(b) and 10(u) of the Zoning Ordinance of the
Town of Somers which took respondents out of the class of those afforded protection
in the original Zoning Ordinance. The court concluded that sections 5(b) and 10(u)
unreasonably deprived the respondents of a vested right and required them to seek
permission to do that which they already had a legal right to do.
The court did not entertain " . . the question of what may be a proper exercise of
the town's police powers so as to prevent the creation or maintenance of a nuisance on
the premises of the defendants, or to otherwise lawfully regulate the defendants' busi-
ness." 1 1
Judge Fuld, dissenting, noted that "while the effect of the court's decision will not,
of course, toll the death knell of zoning, it certainly ushers in a sad day for sound, wise,
and adequate municipal planning."12 Although the record did not disclose the exact
dimensions of respondents' gravel pits it would seem that they " . . . comprised but a
small portion of the total acreage" and this being so, "The mere intention to excavate
the remainder of the land did not amount to an existing use so as to entitle defendants
to a non-conforming use encompassing and protecting their entire tract of fifty-five
acres."13
In support of this conclusion it was suggested that "if a single excavation in a
given area of a large parcel of land were to create vested rights in the entire tract, a
special privilege would be conferred upon sand and gravel operators, which is not
recognized even in the case of substantial buildings and structures." 14 The dissent urges
that the majority holding might well mean that "a dog kennel run, a mink farm, or a
piggery" which was in existence at the time of the adoption of a zoning ordinance
prohibiting such use could be extended so as to include an owner's entire tract of land.
In Chayt v. Zoning Appeals Board,15 a Maryland case in point, which involved the
building of stables for an existing racetrack in a residentially zoned area, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland ruled that "A use that now exists or now legally exists would
somewhat emphatically exclude a use merely contemplated for the future, but un-
realized. And it would be unlikely that a zoning ordinance would make provision for
so unsubstantial a thing as a plan in mind.' 1 6 A mere expectancy of future benefit, or
a contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws,
does not constitute a vested right.
1 7
7 U. S. CONST. amend. XIV.
8 See note 5 supra, at 325, 72 N. E. at 232.
9 See note 4 supra.
10 See note 5 supra.
11 See note 1 supra, at 541, 127 N. E. 2d at 331.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Id. at 542.
15 177 Md. 426, 9 A. 2d 747 (1939).
16 Id. at 749.
17 Norris v. Beyea, 13 N. Y. 273 (1855); Westervelt v. Greg, 12 N. Y. 202 (1854);
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The tenor of the dissent would seem to be that existing non-conforming uses
should be preserved, not extended. The minority opinion urges that, "So much of the
zoning ordinance as regulates the method of excavation and limits the area of such
excavation to five acres is a reasonable exercise of the town's powers .. and violates
no constitutional provision,"' 8 but the "provisions of the ordinance requiring the re-
moval of all structures at the end of each licenses period are unconstitutional insofar
as defendants are concerned since it deprives them of their non-conforming use en-
tirely."'19
It may well be that if the majority opinion, as expressed in the instant case, be-
comes an increasingly popular and accepted view, the limiting and restricting functions
of zoning ordinances will be greatly diminished, and the general purpose of zoning
ordinances will be somewhat frustrated.
Moore v. New York, 8 N. Y. 110 (1853); People v. Coler, 71 App. Div. 584, 76 N. Y.
Supp. 205 (lst Dept. 1902); Matter of Stebbins, 41 App. Div. 269, 58 N. Y. Supp. 468
(2d Dept. 1899) ; Matter of the Mayor of New York, 33 App. Div. 365, 53 N. Y. Supp.
875 (1st Dept. 1898), aff'd 158 N. Y. 668, 52 N. E. 1125 (1899); Matter of Wilkins
Place, 54 N. Y. Supp. 65 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1898).
18 See note 1 supra, at 542, 127 N. E. 2d at 332.
19 Id. at 543, 127 N. B. 2d at 332.
